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Top: Federal Bureaucratic Powers

COMMENT
HOW THE RISE OF FEDERAL
BUREAUCRATIC POWERS
CHALLENGES THE ROLE OF
COURTS IN ADJUDICATING
CLAIMS OF INJURY INFLICTED BY
PRESCRIPTION DRUGS
INTRODUCTION

Chris Magnotta was one of the few people working in the
World Trade Center buildings who survived the terrorist attack
on September 11, 2001. 1 The aftermath of the traumatic event
left him with nightmares, disrupted sleep, and anxiety attacks-none of which he had experienced before the attack. 2
Chris's doctor diagnosed him with post-traumatic stress disorder and prescribed Paxi1. 3 Mter six months, Chris was feeling
better and consequently decided to stop taking the drug. 4
Within 48 hours, he began to experience symptoms such as
nausea, severe fatigue, and the sensation of electric "zaps"
shooting through his body.5 These debilitating symptoms
1 A Big Letdown?, PEOPLE MAGAZINE, May 12, 2003, at 191-92.
2Id.
th
3 DSM-IV-TR 463 (4
ed, 2000). Posttraumatic stress disorder is when a person
re-experiences an extremely traumatic event accompanied by symptoms that cause a
significant impairment in social, occupational, or other important areas of functioning
Id.; supra note 1.
• Id.
• THoMAS C. TIMMRECK, PH.D., HEALTH SERVICES CYCLOPEDIC DICTIONARY A
COMPENDIUM OF HEALTH-CARE AND PuBLIC HEALTH TERMINOLOGY 522 (Jones and
Bartlett Publishers 1997) (1982). The sensation of "electric zaps" or strange sensations
felt on the skin (e.g., burning, tickling, and tingling) is medically termed paresthesia.
Id.

393

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 2004

1

Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 34, Iss. 2 [2004], Art. 6

394

GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 34

forced him back onto Paxil. 6 With the help of his doctor, he
weaned himself off the drug completely within four months. 7
Chris was never warned of the potential adverse withdrawal
reactions that can occur when the drug is stopped abruptly.8
He explained, "I want a clear warning of the side effects. .
. [nlobody should have to go through this." 9
Katherine Keith was prescribed Paxil for menopausal
symptoms in 1997. 10 After experiencing relief from her symptoms, she stopped taking the drug. l l Within 24 hours, Keith
started experiencing nonstop vomiting and diarrhea, and intolerable brain "zaps" that caused uncontrollable crying. 12 Keith
claims that the symptoms were intolerable to such a degree
that on two separate occasions she stuck a pistol in her mouth
and had to convince herself not to pull the trigger. 13 Like Chris
Magnotta, she was forced back onto Paxil and with her doctor's
help was able to wean herself completely off the drug .14
Magnotta and Keith are just two of tens of millions of
Americans, one out of every ten, that have taken a Selective
Serotonin Reuptake Inhibitor (hereinafter "SSRI") antidepressant. 15 Prozac, Zoloft, Paxil, Luvox, and Celexa are drugs included in this newer class of antidepressant medications. 16 As
a class, the SSRIs are easy to use--they usually just require one
pill per day and have fewer, less complicated side effects than
Supra note 1.
7Id.
'Id.
gId.
I°Id.
11 Id.
12 Id.
13 Id.
" Id.
"See JOSEPH GLENMULLEN, M.D., PROZAC BACKLASH 15 (Simon & Schuster
2000); There are many stories like the ones detailed above. Id. Tanya, a Paxil patient,
went swimming at her health club. Id. at 64. On her second lap she felt like she was
stuck by a bolt of lightning. Id. She was terrified and began flailing in the water. Id.
Eventually another swimmer pulled her out of the water. Id. Immediately she asked
her rescuer if he had experienced any sensation of electrical shocks in the water. Id.
He had not. Id. The electric shocks continued as she sat poolside. Id. at 64-65. Starting from her brain she felt the shocks travel down her arms; her vision was jumping
back and forth; she felt nausea and dizziness accompanied by a buzzing in her ears. Id.
at 65. She thought she was experiencing a panic attack. Id. Her doctor explained that
she was probably experiencing withdrawal symptoms. Id. Tanya had stopped taking
Paxil two days earlier. Id.
16 WILLIAM S. APPLETON, M.D., PROZAC AND THE NEW ANTIDEPRESSANTS 50
(Deborah Brody ed., Penguin Books 2000) (1997).
6
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older antidepressants. 17 There is also extensive scientific
documentation that patients may experience withdrawal when
they discontinue use of SSRIs.18
In August 2001, thirty-five Californians who allegedly suffered severe withdrawal reactions from taking Paxil filed a
class action against the manufacturer, GlaxoSmithKline Corporation (hereinafter "aSK"), in California Superior COurt. 19
The action sought to hold aSK liable for suppressing information about the drug's withdrawal effects. The plaintiffs asserted that aSK knew but failed to warn about Paxil's addictive traits. 20
The plaintiff class sought a preliminary injunction to enjoin aSK from publicizing the statement, "Paxil is non habit-

17 Id at 57. Older antidepressants meaning the tricyclics which include trofanil,
elavil, norpramin to name a few.Id.
18 Michelle
Fitzgerald, B.Sc (Pharm), SSRI Discontinuation Syndrome, 4
ATLANTIC PSYCHOPHARMACOLOGY QUARTERLY 3 (Issue 2, 2001). Reports indicate that
30% of patients will experience some withdrawal type symptom upon reduction of
dosage or discontinuation of use. Id. The symptoms may include dizziness, lightheadedness, vertigo or feeling faint; shock-like sensations (called paresthesia); anxiety;
diarrhea; fatigue; gait instability; headache; insomnia; nausea; tremor; and visual
disturbances. Id. Symptoms may develop within one to seven days of discontinuation
or reduction in dosage, after at least one month's use of an SSRI. Id. See also Robert
N. Golden, Ph.D, Selective Serotonin Reuptake Inhibitor Elimination Half-Lives: The
Long and the Short of It, 44 BIOLOGICAL PSYCHIATRY 75-6 (Issue 2, 1998) (finding that,
"[tlhis reported relationship between SSRI elimination half-life and risk of withdrawal
syndrome is reminiscent of what we learned some time ago about benzodiazepines and
their addictive derivatives."); see APPLETON, at 73, supra note 16.
19 Paxil Users File Class Suit Over Withdrawal Reaction, 5 No. ANDREWS DRUG
RECALL LITIG, REp. 9 (November 2001) (reporting that Keith v. GloxoSmithKline Corp.
was filed in Cal. Superior Court, Los Angeles County on August 23, 2001); California
'Court to Consider Renewed Paxil Class Suit, 19 No. ANDREWS PHARMACEUTICAL LITIG,
REP. 10 (July 2003). In January 2003, a federal judge refused to certify a nationwide
class stating the proposal would create a trial plan too complicated for a jury to follow.
Id. The judge denied the class certification with leave to amend. Id. The plaintiffs refiled their suit to form two classes, an injunction class and a general damages class,
limited to representing all Californians who were prescribed and consumed Paxil. Id.
20 See generally Notice of Motion and Motion for Preliminary Injunction; Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support Thereat In re Paxil Litigation, No. CV01-07937 MRP (CWx), (C.D. Cal. filed July 1, 2002) (asking that GSK be prohibited
from making claims that Paxil is non habit-forming; stopped from down playing the side
effects as mild and temporary; and prohibited from claiming that the drug has been
studied in short and long-term use and is not associated with dependence or addiction).
Telephone interview with Cindy Hall, Paralegal, Baum, Hedlund, Aristei, Guilford &
Shiavo (Oct. 3, 2003). Also, the plaintiffs seek to stop GSK from using the term "discontinuation syndrome" because they allege the term has no purported medical meaning.
Id.
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forming," in national television commercials. 21 The plaintiffs
claimed that because patients suffered from severe withdrawal
reactions after attempting to discontinue Prucil, the use of the
phrase was false and misleading. 22 The court found the plaintiffs had demonstrated that severe withdrawal reactions do in
fact occur in at least some patients. 23 The court reasoned that
the phrase hindered the efforts of patients to seek and receive
proper treatment for withdrawal symptoms. 24 As a result, the
motion for a preliminary injunction was granted. 25
In response to the order, GSK filed a motion to suspend
the preliminary injunction, as well as a motion for reconsideration. 26 In addition, the Food and Drug Administration (hereinafter "FDA") filed a brief supporting GSK's position that the
advertisements were not misleadingp The court reversed itself
and denied the injunction based specifically on evidence presented by the FDA regarding the internal review process involved in the advertisements in question. 28 Incidentally, certification of the proposed class was rejected in June of 2003. 29
The litigation, however, is continuing in the form of a mass
joinder.30
Although Prucil is the SSRI most likely to cause severe
withdrawal effects, the drug manufacturer and the FDA insist
that Prucil is not habit-forming. 31 The FDA has complicated
this legal battle by alleging that courts lack jurisdiction over

21 Memorandum of Decision re: Preliminary Injunction at 2, In re Paxil Litigation, No. CV-OI-07937 MRP (CWx), (C.D. Cal. filed August 16, 2002)
22 Id. at 1.
23 Id. at 2
24 Id. at 10.
25 Id.
26 Memorandum of Decision re: Motion for Reconsideration of Order Granting
Preliminary Injunction at 10, In re Paxil Litigation, No. CV-OI-07937 MRP (CWx),

(C.D. Cal. filed October 21, 2002).
27 Id. at 1-2.
23 Id. at 4.
29 Telephone interview with Donald Farber, Law Office of Donald J. Farber (Oct.
3, 2003). The certification of the state-wide proposed class was rejected in June 2003,
but the litigation is continuing in the form of a national mass joinder. Id. There are
fifteen cases across the country filed in both state and federal court. Id. The plaintiffs
are hoping for a consolidation of all fifteen cases in Los Angeles, California for discovery purposes. Id.
30
31

Id.
See Brief of the United States at 3-4, In re Paxil Litigation, No. CV-OI-07937

(CWx), (C.D. Cal. filed Sept. 4, 2002).
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the issue of whether Paxil is habit-forming. 32 The FDA contends that the determination of whether a drug is habitforming falls within the exclusive power of the agency.33
The recent litigation surrounding Paxil illustrates the obstacles injured plaintiffs face in recovering for harms suffered
from side effects associated with prescription drugs. This
Comment uses the recent Paxil litigation as an example of how
the rise of federal bureaucratic powers, specifically those exercised by the FDA to administer the Food Drug and Cosmetic
Act (hereinafter "FDCA"), increasingly challenge the role of
courts in adjudicating tort claims of injury inflicted by prescription drugs. Part I explains the current labeling requirements
for prescription drugs. 34 Part II describes product liability law
regarding claims involving prescription drugs. 3s Part III analyzes the drug manufacturers' and FDA's defenses to state tort
claims, specifically preemption and primary jurisdiction.36 Part
IV discusses the current law as it applies to the recent Paxil
litigation. 37 Part V analyzes alternative interpretations that
would achieve fairer results. 3S Finally, Part VI of this Comment concludes that FDA prescription drug labeling requirements should be viewed as minimal guidelines subject to enhancement by state court jury verdicts. 39
I.

CURRENT REGULATIONS FOR PRESCRIPTION DRUGS

Congress delegates authority to agencies to carry out their
missions through the use of enabling statutes. 40 One example
of an enabling statute is the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic
Act (hereinafter "FDCA"). 41 The FDCA assigns responsibility
to the FDA to ensure that drugs marketed in the United States

See discussion in Part III, infra.
Brief of the United States at 9, In re Paxil Litigation, No. CV-01-07937 (CWx),
(C.D. Cal. filed Sept. 4, 2002).
34 See infra notes 40-71 and accompanying text.
35 See infra notes 72-96 and accompanying text.
36 See infra notes 97-162 and accompanying text.
37 See infra notes 163-206 and accompanying text.
38 See infra notes 207-251 and accompanying text.
39 See infra notes 252 and accompanying text .
.., ELIZABETH C. RICHARDSON, J.D., ADMINISTRATIVE LAw AND PROCEDURE 48
(Delmar Publishers 1996).
41 21 U.S.C. § 301 et seq. (2000).
32
33
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are safe and effective. 42 The regulation of drugs marketed in
the United States includes a process for approval, promotion,
and labeling of new drugs. 43 The FDA has designed a regulatory labeling scheme to ensure that necessary information is
given to physicians so that they can prescribe the safe and effective use of drugs. 44
A.

LABELING REQUIREMENTS FOR PRESCRIPTION DRUGS

Prescription medications are drugs that are approved by
the FDA and available to the public only when dispensed by
licensed physicians and pharmacists. 45 The availability of prescription medications is limited because they are considered
unsafe if used without the supervision of a physician. 46 A licensed medical practitioner balances the benefits of using a
particular prescription drug against the accompanying risks on
a patient-by-patient basis. 47 To assist medical practitioners in
balancing important risk information, the FDA provides strict
labeling requirements for prescription drugs. 48
A drug cannot be legally introduced into the market unless
it is approved by the FDA. 49 The approval process begins by the
submission of a New Drug Application (hereinafter "NDA").50
42 21 U.S.C. § 335 (2000); 21 C.F.R. § 5.1O(a)(1) (2003) (The United States Secretary of Health and Human Services delegated authority to the FDA).
43 See Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. § 301 (2000).
« See infra Part II for further discussion about the duty to warn and the learned
intermediary doctrine .
.. TIMMRECK, at 572 supra note 5 (providing the medical definition of prescription drugs); see 21 U.S.C. § 393 (2000) (granting the FDA the authority to ensure that
drugs are safe and effective).
.. 21 U.S.C. § 353(b)(1) (2000).
47 See Lindsay v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 637 F.2d 87, 91 (2d Cir. 1980); see also
Reyes v. Wyeth Lab., 498 F.2d 1264, 1276 (5 th Cir. 1974).
.. 21 U.S.C. §393 (2000). The FDA's mission is to promote public health by reviewing clinical research and taking appropriate action on the marketing of regulated
products in a timely manner. [d. The FDA is the agency that ensures that human and
veterinary drugs are safe and effective. [d.; see United States v. Sullivan, 332 U.S. 689,
696 (1948) (stating that the FDA was created to "protect consumers from dangerous
products.") .
• 9 21 U.S.C. § 355(a) (2000); Edison Pharm. Co., Inc. v. Food and Drug Admin.,
Dept. of Health, Ed., and Welfare, 600 F.2d 831 (D.C. Cir. 1979). (finding that new
drug application could not be approved "[wlhere drug manufacturer failed to comply
with this chapter and regulations governing the manufacturing, sampling and labeling
of proposed new drug... ").
50 21 U.S.C. § 355 (b) (l)(F) (2000); 21 C.F.R. § 201.100(c)(2) (2003); See 21 C.F.R.
§ 314.50 (2003) (detailing the contents of the NDA).
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When filing an NDA, a drug manufacturer is required to submit all proposed labeling, which includes the information of
risks associated with the drug. 51 FDA drug labeling regulations
categorize risk information according to the severity of the risk
and the degree to which the risk has been scientifically validated. 52 The label hierarchy for disclosing risk information
spans from the most severe situations, called contraindications,
to the least serious side effects, known as adverse reactions. 53
As side effects increase in intensity and severity, the manufacturer's warning with respect to the drug's potential for harm
ascends to a higher label heading. 54 In the NDA labeling, a
manufacturer must establish that a drug is safe and effective
for its specified uses. 55

" 21 U.S.C. § 355 (b) (1) (F) (2000); 21 C.F.R. §§ 314.50 (c)(2)(i) (2003), 314.110
(2003) (detailing the approval letter after NDA application meets requirements).
52 See generally 21 C.F.R § 201.57 (a)-(m) (2003).
See also Lars Noah, The Imperative to Warn: Disentangling the "Right to Know" From the "Need to Know" About
Consumer Product Hazards, 11 YALE J. ON REG. 293, 327 (1994).
63 21 C.F.R. § 201.57 (a)-(m) (2003) (specifying the topic headings and mandated
order for prescription drug labeling as: Description, Clinical Pharmacology, Indications
and Usage, Contraindications, Warnings, Precautions, Adverse Reactions, Drug Abuse
and Dependence, Overdosage, Dosage and Administration, How Supplied, Animal
Pharmacology and/or Animal Toxicology, and "Clinical Studies" and "References."). See
McFadden v. Haritatos, 448 N.Y.S.2d 79, 81 (N.Y. App. Div. 1982) (stating it was obvious the labeling sections were set forth in the C.F.R. in descending order of importance.); 21 C.F.R. § 201.57 (d) (2003) (Contraindications "shall describe those situations
in which the drug should not be used because the risk of the use clearly outweighs any
possible benefit ... [k]nown hazards and not theoretical possibilities shall be listed.").
Cf 21 C.F.R. § 201.57 (g) (2003) (describing an adverse reaction as an "undesirable
effect" reasonably associated with the drug). The drug manufacturer must list the
approximate frequency of each adverse reaction in rough estimates or orders of magnitude. Id. For example, "[t]he most frequent adverse reactions(s) to (name of drug) is
(are)(list reactions). This (these) occur(s) in about (e.g., on-third of patients; one in 30
patients; less than one-tenth of patients). Less frequent adverse reactions are (list
reactions), which occur in approximately (e.g., one in 100 patients). Other adverse
reactions, which occur rarely, in approximately (e.g., one in 1,000 patients), are (list
reactions)." Id. Percent figures are only permitted if they are well documented by
controlled studies, they reflect general experience, and they do not imply a greater
degree of accuracy than what exists.). Id.
54 Id.
55 21 U.S.C.§ 355 (b), (d) (2000). See also Declaration of Thomas Scarlett at 3, In
re Paxil Litigation, No. CV-OI-07937 MRP (CWx), (C.D. Cal filed July 19, 2002). Thomas Scarlett is a partner in Hyman, Phelps, & McNamara, a law firm that specializes
in matters concerning the FDA Id. at 2.
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FDA PROCESS FOR DRUG APPROVAL

The FDA determines safety and effectiveness by reviewing
the conditions of use that are specified in the labeling contained in the NDA.56 The drug manufacturer and the FDA attempt to reconcile any differences on what content should appear in the labeling. 57 Ultimately, the FDA reserves the right
to condition the final approval of a new drug based on label revisions suggested by the agency.58 The labeling is commonly
referred to as the "package insert" or "prescribing information"
and is considered the official labeling for a drug. 59 Once approved, the labeling may not be changed without FDA approval, except for minor changes. GO The labeling is intended to
summarize all information a physician requires to prescribe
the drug in a safe and effective manner.61
Mter receiving all contents of the NDA, the FDA conducts
a comprehensive safety review of the clinical data contained in
the application. 62 The safety review is designed to identify potential safety risks, to assess whether the drug is sufficiently
safe for public use and whether certain risks should be disclosed in the drug labeling. 63 During its review, the FDA performs a drug abuse liability assessment. 64 Abuse liability is
.. Id. at 3.
" Id .
.. See 21 U.S.C. § 355 (b) (1) (F) (2000); 21 C.F.R. §§ 314.50 (c) (2) (i) (2003),
314.110 (2003) .
.. SCARLETI' at 3, supra note 55.
60 Id.; 21 C.F.R. §§ 201.100(c)(2) (2003); 314.70 (2003); see notes 154-155, infra.
(citing state court holdings in which the drug manufacturer was responsible for providing more information than required by FDA regulations).
61 Brochu v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 642 F.2d 652, 658 n.11 (1" Cir. 1981); SCARLETT
at 3,supra note 55.
62 Declaration of Thomas Kline at 4, In re Paxil Litigation, No. CV-OI-07937
(CWx), (C.D. Cal. filed July 19, 2002). Thomas Kline is the Director of U.S. Regulatory
Affairs at GSK. Id. As a director he is required to act as a liaison between GSK and
the FDA regarding marketed and investigational drug products. Id. at 2.
63 Id. at 4.
54 See 21 U.S.C. § 811 (2000); 21 U.S.C. § 301 (2000); Draft Guidelines for Abuse
Liability Assessment at 1, Drug Abuse Advisory Committee, FDA (July 1990), In re
Paxil Litigation, No. CV-OI-07937 (CWx), Exhibit 2. The FDA created the Drug Abuse
Advisory Committee (hereinafter "DAAC") to prepare the guidelines for abuse liability
assessments. Id. In drafting the guidelines the DDAC considered (1) the promotion of
public health by encouraging the development of safe and effective drugs; and (2) the
protection of the public health by insuring that new products are introduced with an
adequate degree of scientific knowledge and, where indicated, and appropriate degree
of regulatory control related to their abuse liability. Id.
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"the likelihood that a drug with psychoactive or central nervous
system effects will sustain patterns of non-medical selfadministration that result in disruptive or undesired consequences."65 Although the FDA does not prescribe an exact standard for testing, it does place the responsibility on the manufacturer to test for abuse liability in animals and humans. 66 All
NDAs include a section addressing possible issues concerning
abuse liability.67 The drug manufacturer is required to submit
its testing information in this section in the NDA. 68
If the FDA determines the drug does have abuse potential,
it notifies the Drug Enforcement Agency (hereinafter "DEA"),
who may consider scheduling the drug as a controlled substance under the Controlled Substances Act. 69 If the FDA decides the drug does not have abuse potential, it does not notify
the DEA.70 After a new drug is approved and introduced to the
public, the FDA continues to monitor the frequency and severity of adverse drug experiences to assess whether labeling
changes are necessary. 71
II.

PRODUCT LIABILITY LAw AND PRESCRIPTION DRUGS

Typically, under product liability law, an injured plaintiff
can bring an action to recover against a manufacturer based on
strict liability theory. 72 Section 402A of the Restatement (Sec65 Id. at 2.
&SId.
67 Id. at 3.
saId.
69 See 21 U.S.C. §§ 811(c), (f) (2000); 21 C.F.R. § 314.104 (2003).
70 SCARLETT at 10-11, supra note 55; see generally DRAFT GUIDELINES at 1, supra

note 64.
71 21 C.F.R. §§ 310.303(a) (2003), 310.305 (b) (2003), 314.80(a) (2003). The manufacturer has a duty to advise the FDA of any reports of "adverse experiences" with the
drug, often referred to as postmarketing reports. 21 C.F.R. § 314.80(a) (2003). An
adverse drug experience is any adverse event occurring in the course of the use of a
drug product in professional practice; from drug overdose, whether accidental or intentional; from drug abuse; from drug withdrawal; and any failure of expected pharmacological action. Id. The "adverse experience" must be reported whether it is reasonably
associated with the drug or not. Id. For the purpose of this Comment, the terms
"risks," "dangers," and "(adverse) side effects" will be used interchangeably even
though there may be subtle differences distinguishing the terms.
72 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965). For the origin of the
strict liability doctrine, see Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 150 P.2d 436 (Cal. Dist.
Ct. App. 1944) (Traynor, J., concurring) (formulating the strict liability doctrine which
holds a manufacturer absolutely liable if when it placed a product on the market, it
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ond) of Torts suggests a manufacturer of a product is strictly
liable for injuries to consumers, or their property, caused by
defects in the design of the product. 73 Products deemed "unavoidably unsafe" are an exception to the general strict liability
rule. 74 An injured plaintiff, however, can bring an action for an
unavoidably unsafe product if the manufacturer has not provided adequate warnings on the product. 75
A.

PRESCRIPTION DRUGS ARE UNAVOIDABLY UNSAFE
PRODUCTS

Under products liability law, prescription drugs are presumed to be unavoidably unsafe. 76
Unavoidably unsafe products create risks to the user even when used as intended. 77
Comment k to Restatement Section 402A acknowledges that
there exist products that, in the present state of human knowledge, are incapable of being made safe for their intended use. 78
knew the product was to be used without inspection, and the product proved to have a
defect that caused injury).
73 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
This section suggests that
manufacturers are strictly liable for injuries to the consumer or his/her property if the
court deems a "defective condition unreasonably dangerous." [d. See 63 AM. JUR. 2D
Products Liability § 545 (1997). This is true even if the manufacturer shows that the
product was faultlessly designed and manufactured, but dangerous or likely to cause
harm if not properly used. [d.; see also Savina v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 795 P.2d 915, 923
(Kan. 1990) (identifying the three main types of product defects: manufacturing flaws,
design defects, and inadequate warnings with regard to use); PROSSER & KEETON, THE
LAw OF TORTS § 99, at 695-98 (5 th ed. 1984.
,. See Grunberg v. The Upjohn Co., 813 P.2d 89 (Utah 1991) (analyzing the application of comment k).
75 See generally, RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
See e.g., Grunberg, 813 P.2d at 92 (finding that UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-18- 2(1)
(Supp. 1990) presents a rebuttable presumption that FDA-approved drugs are unavoidably unsafe). Cf. Kearl v. Lederle Laboratories, 172 Cal.App.3d 812 (1985) (stating that California was the first state to utilize a risklbenefit analysis to determine
which drugs fell within the protective scope of comment k). But see Brown v. Superior
Court, 751 P.2d 470, 483 (Cal. 1988) (overturning Kearl and establishing the rule in
California, that all prescription drugs are entitled as a matter of law to an exemption
from strict liability claims based upon design defects). Some courts have applied comment k on a case-by-case basis to determine if a drug is "unavoidably unsafe." See
Toner v. Lederle Lab., 732 P.2d 297 (Idaho 1987; Savina, 795 P.2d at 915; see also
Feldman v. Lederle Lab. ,479 A2d 374, 382-83 (N.J. 1984) (dealing with allegations of
failure to warn, but asserting, "Whether a drug is unavoidably unsafe should be decided on a case-by-case basis .... ").
77 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt k (1965).
There are some
products that are incapable of being made safe for their intended and ordinary use. [d.
These are especially common in the field of drugs. [d.

7.

78

[d.
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Accordingly, products that fall within this category are protected against strict liability claims. 79 Therefore, manufacturers of unavoidably unsafe products are not held strictly liable
for injuries so long as their products are accompanied by proper
warnings. 80 In the absence of a strict liability claim, a manufacturer may nevertheless be held liable for injuries to a consumer if the plaintiff can show the manufacturer failed to adequately warn of the product's risks. 81
B.

DuTY To WARN: THE LEARNED INTERMEDIARY DOCTRINE

Generally, the manufacturer of an unavoidably unsafe
product has a duty to warn the product's intended and foreseeable users of the product's dangers. 82 Prescription drug manufacturers constitute an exception to the general rule. 83 A prescription drug manufacturer's duty to warn is satisfied when a
warning of the risks associated with a drug is given directly to
the physician. 84 The physician acts as the "learned intermediary" between the drug manufacturer and the patient. 85 The
79

[d.

[d. See Brochu v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 642 F.2d 652, 657 (1" Cir. 1981); Reyes
v, Wyeth Lab., 498 F.2d 1264, 1276 (5th Cir. 1974); Davis v. Wyeth Lab., Inc., 399 F.2d
121, 128-9 (9'h Cir. 1968); Yarrow v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 263 F. Supp. 159, 163
(D.S.D.1967), aft'd, 408 F.2d 978 (8th Cir. 1969); Brown, 751 P.2d at 481; Toner, 732
P.2d at 305; Savina, 795 P.2d at 924; Feldman, 479 A.2d at 374; Castrignano v. E.R.
Squibb & Sons, Inc., 546 A.2d 775, 780 (R.I. 1988); Theresa Schwartz, Product Liability
Law and Pharmaceuticals: New Developments and Divergent Trends, 43 FOOD DRUG
COSMo L.J. 33 (1988) (giving an explanation of the widespread court-acceptance of
comment k's applicability to prescription drug manufacturers) .
•, Grundberg, 813 P.2d at 92, citing Toner, 732 P.2d at 305 ("The purpose of
comment k is to protect from strict liability products that cannot be designed more
safely. Ifhowever, such products are mismanufactured or unaccompanied by adequate
warnings, the seller may be liable even if the plaintiff cannot establish the seller's
negligence ....This limitation on the scope of comment k immunity is universally recognized.").
82 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. j (1965) (mandates that manufacturers provide warnings). PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAw OF TORTS, 698 (5 th ed.
1984). (Warnings should be directed at the intended users as well as at reasonably
foreseeable users.).
83 Lindsay, 637 F.2d at 91 (holding that "the manufacturer's duty is to warn the
doctor, not the patient. The doctor acts as an 'informed intermediary' between the
manufacturer and the patient, evaluating the patient's needs, assessing the risks and
benefits of available drugs, prescribing one, and supervising its use.")
.. [d. See e.g., Thomas v. Hoffman-LaRoche, Inc., 949 F.2d 806, 811 (5 th Cir.
1992); Sterling Drug, 408 F.2d at 992 (8th Cir. 1969); Wyeth Lab., Inc. v. Fortenberry,
530 So. 2d 688, 691-92 (Miss. 1988).
.. See Lindsay, 637 F.2d at 91; Reyes, 498 F.2d at 1276 (summarizing the underlying principle behind the learned intermediary doctrine).
80
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"learned intermediary" rule exists because it is the physician
who evaluates the risks and benefits of prescription treatments
when selecting drugs for the patient. 86 Furthermore, it is the
physician who has a duty to communicate the risks associated
with drug treatment directly to the patient. 87 For that reason,
it is the physician, rather than the patient, who requires the
warning from the manufacturer. 88
If the manufacturer does not adequately warn the physician, the patient could file a lawsuit claiming that the manufacturer breached its duty to provide adequate warnings. 89
Most commonly, the manufacturer has provided a warning that
the plaintiff alleges is inadequate. 9o A patient may, for instance, experiences a side effect that was not included in the
label. 91 When the label clearly warns of the plaintiffs injury, a
court will grant summary judgment in favor of the manufacturer. 92 Courts must assess on a case-by-case basis whether a
particular risk warning is adequate. 93
Courts generally fmd warnings to be adequate if they convey a fair message of the necessary level of caution required to
avoid the potential dangers. 94 For instance, warning labels
have been considered inadequate because of diluted language
.. Id.
87Id.
88 Reyes, 498 F.2d at 1276 (finding that the choice the physician makes is "an
informed one, an individualized medical judgment bottomed on a knowledge of both
patient and palliative," but that there are situations where the manufacturer must
warn the patient directly because doses are standardized). See, e.g., Id. (extending
duty to vaccine manufacturers because doses are standardized); MacDonald v. Ortho
Pharm. Corp., 475 N.E.2d 65, 70 (Mass.1985)(extending duty to birth control pill
manufacturers because birth control is taken by healthy women, who should be made
aware of the high incidence of serious risks associated with their use, and recognizing
that some courts have gone so far as to impose a duty on the manufacturer to warn the
patient in a different language from that which the FDA sets forth in its labeling restrictions). See also In re Certified Question from The United States Dist. Court for the
E. Dist. of Mich., 358 N.W. 2d 873 (Mich.1984).
88 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965); PROSSER & KEETON, THE
LAw OF TORTS § 99, at 695-98 (5th ed. 1984);
90 Id.
91Id.
92 E.g., Brick v. Barnes-Hines Pharm. Co., 428 F. Supp. 496, 498 (D.D.C. 1997);
Felix v. Hoffman-LaRoche, Inc., 540 So. 2d 102, 105 (Fla. 1989); Johnson v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 774 F.2d 830, 834-35 (7 th Cir. 1985).
th
93 See Salmon v. Parke, Davis & Co., 520 F.2d 1359, 1363 (4
Cir. 1975); Tampa
Drug Co. v. Wait, 103 So. 2d 603, 609 (Fla. 1958); Seley v. G.D. Searle & Co., 423
N.E.2d 831, 837 (Ohio 1981).
94 Id.

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol34/iss2/6

12

Top: Federal Bureaucratic Powers

2004]

FEDERAL BUREAUCRATIC POWERS

405

or improper tone. 95 Therefore, drug manufacturers who are
acting in compliance with FDA labeling regulations may nevertheless be held liable in state courts for inadequate warnings. 96
The next section discusses common defenses a drug manufacturer may employ in response to failure-to-warn claims based
on inadequate prescription drug labeling.

III. DEFENSES TO STATE TORT CLAIMS: FEDERAL PREEMPTION
AND PRIMARY JURISDICTION

Drug manufacturers are required to follow the drug application and labeling guidelines set forth by the FDA. 97 The
FDA's labeling guidelines strike the balance between providing
enough risk information to provide adequate warning information without over-warning. 98 The policy behind this balance is
that providing too many warnings could intimidate consumers
or lessen the importance of the warning system in genera1. 99
A successful state tort claim against a drug manufacturer
for failure to provide adequate warnings may create a perverse
result. 100 This is because the drug manufacturer has complied
with FDA regulations but is nevertheless being punished for a
violation of state law. 101 To avoid this result, drug manufacturers have asserted defenses of federal preemption and primary
jurisdiction. 102 Both of these defenses are grounded in the notion that the power found, either explicitly or implicitly, within
an agency's enabling statute divests the state courts of their

95 Sterling, 408 F.2d at 994; See e.g., McFadden, 448 N.Y.S.2d at 81 (commenting that when label stated that the drug side effects were reversible the court commented that "tends to qualifY and dilute the whole of the [adverse reactions) section's
admonition."); Tinnerholm v. Parke, Davis & Co., 285 F. Supp. 432, 451 (S.D.N.Y 1968)
(finding that a warning was "water[ed) down" with "shrewd use of descriptive adjectives").
96 See, e.g., Needham v. White Lab., 639 F.2d 394, 396 (7tl> Cir. 1981); Davis, 399
F.2d at 122.
97 See supra Part I for discussion of the labeling requirements for prescription
drugs.
98 See supra Part I for discussion of the FDA process for drug approval.
99 See NOAH at 374, supra note 52. The fourth section contains an in-depth discussion on the hazards and causes of excessive warnings. Id.
100 See Needham, 639 F.2d at 396.
IOIId.
102 E.g., Memorandum of Decision re: Motion for Reconsideration of Order Granting Preliminary Injunction at 2-3, In re Paxil Litigation, No. CV-01-07937 MRP (CWx),
(C.D. Cal. filed Oct. 22, 2002).
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jurisdictional power. l03 The two doctrines are easily confused,
which can lead to misapplication. 104 An understanding of the
doctrines is necessary to grasp how each is applied to litigation
concerning prescription drugs.

A.

FEDERAL PREEMPTION

Federal preemption is derived from the Supremacy Clause
of the United States Constitution. 105 It is the principle that
federal law can supersede any incongruent state law or regulation. lOG The doctrine is fundamental because it allocates power
between the federal and state governments. l07
For preemption purposes, courts have broadly defined federal and state law. l08 Federal law is defined to include the
United States Constitution, federal statutes, and federal regulations promulgated by agencies. l09 State law encompasses
common-law tort actions, state statutes, and state regulations. llo Hence, state court tort actions that are inconsistent
with federal regulations violate the Supremacy Clause. lll
Congress may supersede state law either by express or implied preemption.1l2 Express preemption occurs when Congress
explicitly states that federal law preempts contrary state law. 1l3

103

See infra note 106 and accompanying text.

1" See infra Part IV for discussion of the controversy over the application of the
preemption doctrine as an affirmative defense.
105 See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2; Gibbons v. Ogden 22 U.S. 1,3 (1824).
106 See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2; BLACKS LAw DICTIONARY, 545, (2d ed. 2001)
(defining preemption, derived from the Supremacy Clause, as a principle that a federal
law can supersede any incongruent state law or regulation); Capital Cities Cable, Inc.
v. Crisp, 467 U.S. 691, 698-99 (1984) (finding that under the Supremacy Clause a state
regulation may be pre-empted by federal law first, when Congress has expressed a
clear intent to pre-empt state law through statute; second, when it is expressly stated
or implied that Congress intended to leave no room for the States to supplement federal law; and third, when compliance with both state and federal law is impossible
(citations omitted».
107 Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 248 (1984); see generally Foote,
Administrative Preemption: An Experiment in Regulatory Federalism, 70 VA. L. REv
1429 (1984).
108 See infra notes 109-111.
109 See Hillsborough County v. Automated Med. Lab., 471 U.S. 707, 713 (1985);
Fidelity Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. De La Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 153 (1982).
no See Sperry v. Florida, 373 U.S. 379, 403 (1963).
n1 See note 97, supra.
112 Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525 (1977).
n. See e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1334 (1988) (expressing preemption regarding cigarettes);
Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 515 (1992) (holding federal Cigarette
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Preemption is usually viewed as implied when Congress intends that federal law occupy a given field. 114 Under this form
of implied preemption, courts will find that the federal regulatory scheme is sufficiently comprehensive that there is no room
for additional state law. 115 Finally, even if Congress has not
intended that federal law occupy a field, state law may nevertheless be preempted if it actually conflicts with federal law,
such that compliance with both state and federal law is impossible. 116
Congress has not enacted an express preemption provision
covering prescription drugs.ll7 As a result, common-law failureto-warn claims have been brought against drug manufacturers
notwithstanding the detailed federal labeling requirements. lls
Several courts have held that the FDCA does not impliedly
preempt state law. 119 In the absence of any Supreme Court interpretation, however, the debate continues over whether FDA
labeling regulations preempt state tort law. 120
Labeling and Advertising Act preempted State laws regulating and prohibiting advertising based on smoking and health.)
,,< Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947).
"5Id. at 232 (finding that "[alll the Federal Act requires is that warehousemen
receive products for storage without making discriminations between persons," and
that "[wlhat the lllinois Commission promulgates or requires ... might indeed
strengthen and bolster the federal regulatory scheme and in no way dilute, impair, or
oppose it.").
116 California v. ARC Am. Corp. 490 U.S. 93 (1989).
117 See, e.g., Hillsborough County, 471 U.S. at 714-23; Pharm. Soc'y of the State of
N.Y. v. Lefkowitz, 586 F.2d 953,958 & n.6 (2d Cir. 1978) (holding that a state regulation mandating that drug manufacturer be identified on the label was not preempted).
"8 NOAH at 356, supra note 52; see John F. Del Giorno, Federal Preemption of
Prescription Drug Labeling: Antidote for Pharmaceutical Industry Overdosing on State
Court Jury Decisions in Products Liability Cases, 22 J. MARsHALL L. REv. 629 (1989)
(applying four basic tests, from varied case law, to determine implied preemptive intent and concluding that Congress implied that FDA regulations preempt state law).
"9 See, e.g., Knoll Pharm. Co. v. Sherman, 57 F. Supp. 2d 615, 625 (N.D. lll. 1999)
(considering Knoll's assertion that the FDA's detailed federal regulations covering
advertisement of prescription drugs preempted lllinois' attempt to restrict advertisement by regulating the content of broadcast television a "frivolous argument."); Ohler
v. Purdue Pharma. L.P., 2002 WL 88945, at *9 (E.D. La. 2002) (arguing that "the evidence presented does not clearly demonstrate either that Congress or the FDA intended to preempt the field by implementing regulations pursuant to statutory mandate in the field of prescription drugs labeling, and thereby completely displacing State
laws and regulations which may have the affect of elevating the standards and duties
owed by manufacturers with respect to warnings and labeling of prescription drugs.")
120 E.g., Brief of the United States of America, In re Paxil Litigation, No. CV-0107937 MRP (CWx), (C.D. Cal. filed Sept. 5, 2002); Amicus Brief for the United States in
Support of the Defendant-Appellee and Cross-Appellant, and in Favor of Reversal of
the District Court's Order Denying Partial Summary Judgment to Defendant-Appellee
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PRIMARY JURISDICTION

If a court does not find that federal law preempts a state
tort claim, the FDA may still claim to have exclusive authority
to make the final determinations. 121 Over time, some governmental agencies have developed into adjudicative bodies and
have consequently started to decide issues that were traditionally brought before courtS. 122 Primary jurisdiction is a judicially-made doctrine used to clarify powers allocated between
the agencies and the courtS. 123 The doctrine of primary jurisdiction allows a district court to refer a matter within its original
jurisdiction if doing so will "promot[e] proper relationships between the courts and administrative agencies charged with
particular regulatory duties."124
Primary jurisdiction applies when hearing a dispute involves the resolution of issues that, "under a regulatory
scheme, have been placed in special competence of an administrative body."125 There is no set formula that a court uses to
determine if primary jurisdiction is applicable. 126 Instead, caseby-case analysis is performed to determine if the rationale underlying the doctrine is present and whether the purposes of
the doctrine will be accomplished, if applied. 127 There are factors, however, for a court to consider when determining
and cross-Appellant, Motus v. Pfizer, Inc., Nos. 02-55372, 02-55498, (9th Cir. filed Sept.
2,2002).
121 See infra notes 125-148 and accompanying text.
122 See 2 KENNETH CULP DAVIS & RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAw
TREATISE § 14.1 (3 n1 ed. 1994); Fred Huntsman, Comment, Who Makes the Call? The

Primary Jurisdiction Doctrine in Texas after Cash America International Inc., v. Bennett, Subaru of America, Inc. v. McDavid Nissan, Inc. and Butnaru v. Ford Motor Co.,
54 BAYLORL. REV. 897, 901-06 (2002).
123

Id.

Nader v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc., 426 U.S. 290, 303 (1976); Bernhardt v.
Pfizer, Inc., 2000 WL 1738645, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (explaining that "[tlhe doctrine ... allows a federal court to refer a matter extending beyond the 'conventional experiences of judged' or 'falling within the realm of administrative discretion' to an administrative agency with more specialized experience, expertise, and insight. ").
125 United States v. W. Pac. R.R. Co., 352 U.S. 59, 64 (1956); United States v. Gen.
Dynamics Corp., 828 F.2d 1356, 1363 (9 th Cir. 1987) (holding that "[tlhe particular
agency deferred to must be one that Congress has vested with the authority to regulate
an industry or activity such that it would be inconsistent with the statutory scheme to
deny the agency's power to resolve the issues in question.").
126 W. Pac. R.R. Co., 352 U.S. at 64; KENNETH DAVIS, at 275-76, supra note 122
(explaining how this decision established the test for applying the primary jurisdiction
doctrine).
127 W. Pac. R.R. Co., 352 U.S. at 64.
124
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whether to invoke the doctrine: first, the need for uniformity
and consistency in the regulation of industry delegated to an
agency; second, the need for agency expertise in disputes involving complicated issues of fact that is outside the general
experience of the judiciary; and lastly, the extent that referral
to an agency will add expense and delay.128 It is important to
note that these factors should be examined in light of the circumstances of each case. 129
Courts refer to the agency's enabling statute to evaluate
the three factors listed above, to decide if invocation of primary
jurisdiction is appropriate. 130 Statutory interpretation has led
many courts to misapply and misuse the doctrine. 131 Added to
the seeming confusion is the fact that the doctrine of primary
jurisdiction covers two distinct situations.132
The first situation arises when an issue falls within an
agency's exclusive statutory jurisdiction. 133 If the statute provides that the disputed issue falls within the exclusive original
jurisdiction of the regulatory agency, the court is ousted of its
jurisdictionY4 Nonetheless, the agency's resolution of the issue
will be subject to judicial review. 135 If the agency's resolution of
the issue does not resolve the entire case, then the case continues along whatever path the statute prescribes. 136
The second situation permits a court to refer an issue to an
agency that possesses more information about the issue than
128 See Weinberger v. Bentex Pharm., Inc. 412 U.S. 645, 654 (1973); Far E. Conference v. United States, 342 U.S. 570 (1952); Nader, 426 U.S. at 303; Bernhardt, 2000
WL 1738645, at *2 (balancing the "advantages of applying the ... doctrine against any
potential costs and delays resulting form the referral of the matter .... "); see KENNETH
DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw, at 272-80, supra note 122.
129 W. Pac. R.R. Co., 352 U.S. at 64.
130 See Primary Jurisdiction-Effect of Administrative Remedies on the Jurisdiction of Courts, 51 HARv. L. REV. 1251, 1252 (1937-38).
131 E.g., Farmers Ins. Exch. v. Superior Court, 6 Cal Rptr. 2d 487, 499 n.15 (1992)
(reasoning thus: "[als have other state and federal courts in other contexts, we referred
to "exhaustion" of administrative remedies in this portion of Raja although we were in
fact considering a question of prior resort to administrative procedures under the primary jurisdiction doctrine.").
132 See Memorandum of Decision re: Preliminary Injunction at 5, In re Paxil Litigation, No. CV 01-07937 MRP (CWx), (C.D. Cal. Issued Aug., 16, 2002) (citing Arsberry
v. State of m., 244 F.3d 558, 563 (7 th Cir. 2001); see also KENNETH CULP DAVIS, at 272280, supra notel22.
133 Id.
134 Id.
136 Id.
136 Id.
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the court. 137 Applicability of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction
in this situation is based on the application of a practical test
that balances the advantages and disadvantages of allowing
the agency to resolve the issue. 13s In this situation, a court can
consult an agency even if the agency does not have exclusive
jurisdiction. 139 The doctrine of primary jurisdiction in this kind
of situation is usually invoked when regulations involve arcane
issues, when a court requests an amicus curiae brief from an
agency, or when the court has appointed an agency to be a special master.140 Either the court and the agency share concurrent jurisdiction or the court holds jurisdiction alone and solicits the advice of the agency.141 In sum, one situation under the
primary jurisdiction analysis requires judicial deferral on a
disputed issue to the appropriate agency.142 The other situation
provides the court discretion in seeking out agency assistance. 143
When a legal issue overlaps with factual determinations
that fall within an agency's expertise, the courts must apply
the doctrine of primary jurisdiction to clarify how the courts
and agency need to interface to solve the legal matter.l44 In
order to do this, the court must determine "the character of the
controverted question and the nature of the enquiry necessary
for its solution."145 That is to say, exclusive jurisdiction over an
issue is vested in an agency when it is the regulation itself that
is being attacked or disputed. 146 When a suit is brought for either a discriminatory application or violation of the regulation
(i.e., the regulation itself is not being attacked), the question of
fact does not call for agency discretion and courts may hear the
137Id.
138 Arsberry, 244 F.3d at 563.
139 Id.
140 See Memorandum of Decision re: Preliminary Injunction at 5-6, In re Paxil
Litigation, No. CV 01-07937 MRP (CWx), (C.D. Cal. Issued Aug., 16, 2002)(citing Arsberry, 244 F .3d at 563; see also KENNETH CULP DAVIS, at 272-280, supra note 122.
141 Id.
142 See id.
143 See id.
144 Bernhardt, 2000 WL 1738645, at *2 (applying primary jurisdiction specifically
"to cases involving technical and intricate questions of fact and policy that Congress
has assigned to a specific agency.").
14. PRIMARY JURISDICTION at 1254, supra note 130 (quoting Brandeis, J., in Great
N. Ry. v. Merchants Elevator Co., 259 U.S. 285, 291 (1922».
146 Arsberry, 244 F.3d at 563; see PRIMARY JURISDICTION at 1256, supra note 130;
see also KENNETH CULP DAVIS at 305-09, supra note 122.
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dispute. 147 Thus, questions of law can be decided by courts exclusively, as long as the questions do not depend on technical
knowledge or administrative discretion. 148
Even though a court may have jurisdiction over a suit, it
may still decline to review an agency action if it is not final or if
the petitioner did not exhaust all the administrative remedies
available. 149 Courts generally require the exhaustion of administrative remedies prior to judicial review. 150 A petitioner must
first take a dispute through the agency's administrative process prescribed in the statute before bringing a dispute to the
courtS. 151
Most cases use "finality" and "exhaustion" interchangeably, because if a petitioner has not exhausted an administrative remedy the agency action is not final. 152
The policy behind requiring exhaustion is that if an administrative remedy is unexhausted, the suit is premature; judicial
resources should not be wasted until all possible avenues of
administrative relief have been explored. 153 If, however, "considerations of individual justice, efficiency, or wise judicial administration support the need for judicial review," exhaustion
may not be required. 154 Exhaustion is also usually not required
when it would be futile, for instance, when the agency has already stated that it would deny relief. 155

14' [d.
148 See e.g. PRIMARY JURISDICTION at 1256, supra note 130 (arguing that "[ilf the
interpretation of a tariff turns on the peculiar technical meaning of words, as distinguished from their ordinary meaning, or on the existence of incidents of service alleged
to be attached by usage to the transaction, the question is within the primary jurisdiction of the agency).
14. PRIMARY JURISDICTION at 1261, supra note 130; KENNETH CULP DAVIS at 30509, supra note 122.
150

[d.

151

KENNETH CULP DAVIS at 305-09, supra note 122.

152

[d.

153 See PRIMARY JURISDICTION at 1261, supra note 130; see also KENNETH CULP
DAVIS at 309, supra note 121 (listing five reasons for the exhaustion requirement).
,.. KENNETH CULP DAVIS at 307, supra note 122 (quoting Myers v. Bethlehem
Shipbuilding Corp., 303 U.S. 41, 50-51 (1938) "[It isl the long settled rule of judicial
administration that no one is entitled to judicial relief for a supposed or threatened

injury until the prescribed administrative remedy has been exhausted").
155 PRIMARY JURISDICTION at 1264, supra note 130.
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CONTROVERSY OVER APPLICATION OF PREEMPTION
DOCTRINE AS AN AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

Proponents of FDA preemption insist that it was Congress's intent to give the FDA complete authority, utilizing scientific opinion to determine what prescription drug information
should be made available to the public. 156 The reasoning is that
if courts of various jurisdictions are allowed to decide what
constitutes adequate warnings for safe and effective use, the
public will receive inconsistent labeling information from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. 157 Ultimately, this would frustrate the
FDA's efforts to promote uniformity and consistency in the
regulation of prescription drug labeling. 15s
Opponents of FDA preemption contend that the FDA's
drug labeling requirements are minimum standards subject to
supplementation by a jury's verdict. 159 They believe that it is
up to a lay jury to determine, based on the facts of each case, if
a drug manufacturer has met its common-law duty to warn. 160
Courts have supported this view by verifying that additional
warnings may be added to labeling without advance FDA ap-

'56 21 U.S.C. § 393(b)(4)(2000) (explaining the FDA's mission as one "in consultation with experts in science, medicine, and public health, and in cooperation with consumers, users, manufacturers, importers, packers, distributors, and retailers of regulated products"); see John F. Del Giorno, Federal Preemption of Prescription Drug Labeling: Antidote for Pharmaceutical Industry Overdosing On State Court Jury Decision
in Products Liability Cases, 22 J. MARsHALL L. REV. 629, 644-656 (1989) (giving a
detailed analysis establishing that FDA labeling regulations meet all four of the tests
for implied preemption and, thus, preempt state law); see also Brief of the United
States of America at 4-6, In re Paxil Litigation, No. CV-01-07937 MRP (CWx), (C.D.
Cal. filed Sept. 5, 2002).
'57 See Bernhardt, 2000 WL 1738645, at *3 (directing Pfizer to issue the notices
that would not preclude the FDA from issuing a second notice or requiring Pfizer to do
so, thus creating "the potential for inconsistent directions concerning a serious medical
ailment and how it is best treated").
'58 See 21 U.S.C. § 355 (2000); see also 21 U.S.C. § 301(2000); Weinberger, 412
U.S. at 654; Brief of the United States of America at 5, In re Paxil Litigation, No. CV01-07937 MRP (CWx), (C.D. Cal. filed Sept. 5, 2002).
'59 RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 288C (1965) (instructing that
"[clompliance with a legislative enactment or an administrative regulation does not
prevent a finding of negligence where a reasonable man would take additional precautions.").
th
'60 Wells v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 788 F.2d 741, 746 (11 Cir. 1986) (finding that
"[aln FDA determination that a warning is not necessary may be sufficient for federal
regulatory purposes but still not be sufficient for state tort law purposes."); Savina,
795 P.2d at 931; Feldman, 479 A2d at 391.
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provaU 61 In fact, the FDA itself has recognized that manufacturers may add warnings without advance FDA approval. 162
This supports the argument that federal prescription labeling
regulations do not preempt state tort law.

IV. APPLICATION OF AGENCY PROCEDURES AND LEGAL
DOCTRINES TO PAXIL AND PAXIL LITIGATION

In GSK's motion for reconsideration of the preliminary injunctive order, the drug manufacturer asserted several defenses. 163 GSK's defense was that the court did not have jurisdiction to make a ruling on prescription drug advertising. 164
GSK and the FDA argued that Congress intended the FDA's
drug approval guidelines to preempt state law. 165 Consequently, argued GSK and the FDA, the control and regulation
of the Paxil television advertisements were within the FDA's
exclusive jurisdictional power. 166
If the court did not find that the FDA had exclusive jurisdiction, GSK and the FDA alternatively argued that the FDA
had primary jurisdiction over the issues of drug effectiveness
and drug side effects. 16? According to this argument, since court
lacks the scientific sophistication required to make scientific
determinations, it would be an improper allocation of power to
allow the court to have jurisdiction over issues that require scientific expertise. 16B Under this theory, GSK and the FDA ar-

161 E.g., Feldman, 479 A.2d at 390; In re Tetracycline Cases, 747 F. Supp. 543,
549-50 (W.D. Mo. 1989).
162 Labeling and Prescription Drug Advertising; Content and Format for Labeling
for Human Prescription Drugs, 44 Fed. Reg. 37,434, 37,447 (Food and Drug Admin.
June 26, 1979)( stating "[tlhe addition to labeling and advertising of additional warnings, as well as contraindications, adverse reactions, and precautions regarding the
drug, or the issuance of letters directed to health care professionals is not prohibited by
these regulations.").
163 See Memorandum of Decision re: Motion for Reconsideration of Order Granting
Preliminary Injunction at 2-3, In re Paxil Litigation, No. CV-01-07937 MRP (CWx),
(C.D. Cal. filed October 21, 2002).
164 Id. at 2.
165 Id.
166 Id.
167Id. at 3.
168 Id.
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gued that the court would be acting outside of its core competencies. 169
The court first addressed GSK's and the FDA's position
that the FDCA preempted state law. 170 The court found that
there was no evidence that Congress intended, either expressly
or impliedly, for the FDCA to preempt state law. 171 By suggesting that the FDA preempted state law, GSK and the FDA were
in effect arguing that Congress opted not to provide for a private cause of action while simultaneously doing away with
state common-law claims. 172 In fact, the court found, GSK's and
the FDA's preemption position actually diminished, rather
than advanced, the FDCA's purpose to protect the public. 173
The court next addressed the deference of issues to the
FDA under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction. 174 In its opinion, the court emphasized that it was not called on to resolve
the question of whether Paxil is habit-forming. 175 It was concerned only with whether the phrase could be misleading to
consumers. 176 Accordingly, the court held that it was not necessary to explore issues such as drug effectiveness or drug side
effects, which are areas undisputedly within the FDA's expertise. 177
In contrast, the court explained that in the case of the "non
habit-forming" phrase used in commercials, the question of
whether members of the general public are likely to "[misinterpret] a statement is within one of the courts' core competencies."178 The court stated that it was unwilling to accept the
FDA's determination, though it had given consideration to the
extensive research done by the FDA with regard to Paxil and

[d.
[d. at 2.
171 [d. at 2. The court said that GSK and the FDA arguments run contrary to
other decisions. [d., citing Knoll, 57 F. Supp. 2d at 615; Ohler, 2002 WL 88945, at
*7,8.
172 [d. at 3.
173 [d. (arguing that FDA and GSK's position on Congressional intent when enacting the FDCA "contravenes common sense" and declining the parties' invitation to find
that Congress declined to provide for a private cause of action and to eliminate availability of common law state claims).
'" [d.
175 [d. at 4.
176 [d.
177 [d. at 3.
178 [d.
169
170
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its approval of Paxil's advertisements."179 Ultimately, the court
denied the preliminary injunction because the FDA's evidence
was persuasive to the extent that it changed the court's evaluation of the plaintiffs' likelihood of success on the merits. ISO
While the court denied the injunction, it succinctly analyzed the doctrines of preemption and primary jurisdiction
within the context of the Paxil commercials. 181 Although the
same court also denied the certification of a state-wide class,
plaintiffs are continuing to bring state actions against GSK,
asserting, among other things, failure-to-warn claims.ls2 The
next section sets out the current warning label found on Paxil,
discusses the FDA's process of determining whether a drug is
habit-forming, and illustrates the potential roadblocks plaintiffs may face.
A.

PAXIL WARNING LABELS

The safety review of Paxil was conducted one year prior to
its approva!.I83 Under the heading "Abuse," the FDA's safety
review states:
Incidents of tolerance, dependence and drug seeking were not
observed in patients in the [Paxil] clinical trials. The absence
of such incidents precluded the need for systematic study of
this issue. [Prozac], a widely prescribed and pharmacologi-

179 Id. at 4.
It should be noted that despite the court's reversal, GSK stopped
using the phrase "Paxil is non habit-forming" at the end of television commercials.
Zoloft, a different SSRI antidepressant, is currently running a television commercial
which ends with the phrase "Zoloft is non habit-forming."
180 Memorandum of Decision re: Preliminary Injunction at 7, In re Paxil Litiga·
tion, No. CV 01-07937 MRP, (C.D. Cal. filed Aug. 16, 2002) (citing Am. Motorcyclist
Assoc. v. Watt, 714 F.2d 962 (9th Cir. 1983). In order for the court to grant a preliminary injunction, the plaintiffs must establish four elements. Id. First plaintiffs must
show a likelihood of success on the merits. Id. Second, plaintiffs must show a significant threat of irreparable injury. Id. Third, they must at least tip the scales of justice
in the balance of hardships in favor of the plaintiff. Id. Finally, plaintiffs must prove a
furtherance of public interest. Id.
181 Memorandum of Decision re: Motion for Reconsideration of Order Granting
Preliminary Injunction at 4 (C.D. Cal. filed October 21, 2002).
182 Interview with Donald Farber, Plaintiff Attorney, Law Offices of Donald J.
Farber, in San Rafael, Cal. (Oct. 31, 2003)
183 KLINE at 4, supra note 62.

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 2004

23

Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 34, Iss. 2 [2004], Art. 6

416

GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 34

cally similar compound, has not been abused since its introduction into the market. lS4

Based on the safety review, the agency decided that it did
not consider Paxil to be a habit-forming drug. lsS The FDA considers the term "habit-forming" to fall within the general category of "drug abuse and dependence."ls6
The FDA evaluated Paxil and its product labeling each
time it has been approved for treatment of an additional condition. ls7 In addition, Paxil's labeling has been reviewed as a result of post-marketing reports of adverse events. ISS For instance, in April 2001, Paxil was approved for treatment of generalized anxiety disorder. ls9 Included with the approval letter
was a package label insert for the Adverse Reactions indicating
potential side effects associated with discontinuation of its
use. 190 Eight months later, in December 2001, Paxil was approved for treatment of post-traumatic stress disorder.19l The
package insert attached to that approval letter was revised due
to additional reports of side effects associated with discontinuation. 192 The label change moved the description of the discontinuation side effects up from the Adverse Reactions section to
the more significant Precautions section. 193

184 Id.; Martin Brecher, M.D., D.M.Sc., Review and Evaluation of Clinical Data,
Safety Review at 32, Original NDA 20-031, Paroxetine, (June 19, 1991), In re Paxil
Litigation, No. CV-01-07937 MRP (CWx), Exhibit l.
185 SCARLETI' at 13, supra note 55.
186 Id. at 11.
187 See Declaration of Robert J. Temple, M.D. at 2, In re Paxil Litigation, No. CV01-07937 MRP (CWx), (C.D. Cal. filed Sept. 5, 2002). In September of 2002, Dr. Temple was the Director of the Office of Medial Policy and the Acting Director of the Office
of Drug Evaluation. Id. at 1-2. Both offices are within the FDA's Center for Drug
Evaluation and Research Department. Id. The Office of Drug Evaluation decides
whether to approve NDA's for neuropharmacologic/psychopharmacologic drug products.
Id. He personally reviewed and approved the drug Paxil and its product labeling. Id.
188 Id. at 2.
189 Id.
190 Id. Though the FDA doesn't consider SSRIs to be habit-forming, it does recognize that SSRIs have been known to cause withdrawal symptoms known as "discontinuation syndrome." Id. at 4-5. The FDA believes that there is a critical distinction
between the phenomenon of "discontinuation syndrome" and the drug-seeking behavior
associated with habit-forming drugs. Id.
191Id. at 2.
192 Id.
193Id.
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Ultimately, the FDA has backed GSK's position claiming
that there is no evidence that Paxil is habit-forming. 194 Because
the FDA does not associate the drug with addiction, it only required that GSK add a precaution to the labeling of Paxil to
warn of potential side effects that may occur upon dis continuation. 195 The Precautions category falls third in the descending
hierarchy of label sections. 196 Precautions contain special care
information for the practitioner, to ensure safe and effective
use of the drug. 197 The package insert for Paxil carries the following precaution:
. . . [T]he following adverse events were reported at an incidence of 2% or greater for Paxil and were at least twice that
reported for placebo: abnormal dreams (2.3% vs 0.5%), paresthesia (2.0% vs 0.4%), dizziness (7.1% vs 1.5%). In the majority of patients, these events were mild to moderate and were
self-limiting and did not require medical intervention.
During Paxil marketing, there have been spontaneous reports
of similar adverse events, which may have no causal relationship to the drug, upon the discontinuation of Paxil (particularly when abrupt), including the following: dizziness, sensory
disturbances, (e.g., paresthesias such as electric shock sensations), agitation, anxiety, nausea, and sweating. These events
are generally self-limiting. Similar events have been reported
for other selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors.
Patients should be monitored for these symptoms when discontinuing treatment, regardless of the indication for which
Paxil is being prescribed. A gradual reduction in the dose
rather than abrupt cessation is recommended whenever pos[d. at 4.
http://www.fda.gov/medwatchiSAFETY/2001ldec01.htm (last visited 9/3/03);
Federal Judge Reverses Order Barring Paxil TV Ads, 18 No. 8 ANDREWS
PHARMACEUTICAL LITIG. REp. 14 (Nov. 2002); Telephone interview with Cindy Hall,
Paralegal, Baum, Hedlund, Aristei, Guilford & Shiavo (Oct. 2, 2003). Karen Barth of
Baum, Hedlund, Aristei, Guilford & Shiavo, the firm representing the plaintiffs case,
has commented that it took the FDA over a decade to classify Valium, an anti-anxiety
drug, as habit-forming. [d.
196 NOAH at 327, supra note 52 (explaining that the second most important labeling category, called Warnings, is designated for serious adverse reaction risks, but the
risks are not so serious as to clearly outweigh any possible benefit of the drug).
197 21 C.F.R. § 201.57 (0 (1), (2) (2003). There is a subsection under the Precautions label designated for information to be given to patients to ensure safe and effective use of the drug. [d. This is generally where one would find precautionary information, for example, not to drive while using the drug. See id.
19<

195
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sible. If intolerable symptoms occur following a decrease in
the dose or upon discontinuation of treatment, then resuming
the previously prescribed dose may be considered. Subsequently, the physician may continue decreasing dose but at a
more gradual rate (see DOSAGE and ADMINISTRATION)198
The label change reads that the symptoms "may have no
causal relationship to the drug." Neither does it mention the
terms "withdrawal" or "addictive."199 Because of this, the plaintiffs contend the label changes are too vaguely worded, even for
physicians; hence they do not provide an adequate warning. 20o
The FDA maintains that during its review of the NDA for
Paxil, medical reviewers and scientists determined that there
was no clinical evidence of drug-seeking behavior associated
with its use. 201 Since the FDA determined Prucil to be non
habit-forming, it considered patients to be adequately
warned. 202

B.

APPLICATION OF CURRENT LABELING REGULATIONS MAy
PRODUCE UNJUST RESULTS

Although drug manufacturers may theoretically change a
label at any time to enhance drug safety, the reality is that
manufacturers cannot change a label without FDA approva1. 203
The FDA reinforces its control over label revisions by requiring
manufacturers to report all adverse experiences with a drug
after it has been introduced to the general public. 204 It is the
FDA that makes the final determination whether reports of
http://www.fda.gov/medwatchlSAFETY/200I/decOl.htm (last visited 10/15/03).
at 2, supra note 187 (disclosing that the final printed label was released in
January 2002).
199 http://www.fda.gov/medwatchlSAFETY/2001/decOl.htm (last visited 10/15/03).
See
paragraph two oflabel text. [d.
200 PEoPLE, supra note 1.
201 TEMPLE at 4, supra note 187; SCARLETf at 4, supra note 55; KLINE at 4, supra
note 62.
202 TEMPLE at 4, supra note 187.
203 21 C.F.R. § 314.70(c)(2)(i}-(iv) (2003) (permitting label changes to enhance
safety). Cf Richard M. Cooper, Drug Labeling and Products Liability: The Role of the
Food and Drug Administration, 41 FOOD DRUG COSMo L.J. 233,236 (1986) (explaining
that both the FDA and manufacturers do not foresee that labels may be changed without prior approval).
204 21 C.F.R. §§ 310.303(a) (2003), 310.305(b) (2003), 314.80(a) (2003).
198

TEMPLE
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adverse experiences warrant a label revision. 205 Therefore, under current law, even if courts continue to hold that manufacturers can add more information to warning labels, the FDA's
regulations could make it difficult for manufacturers to make
label revisions.206
V.

ALTERNATIVE INTERPRETATIONS THAT WOULD ACHIEVE
FAIRER RESULTS

Plaintiffs in the recent Paxil litigation are claiming that
the drug manufacturer failed to give adequate warnings that
the drug produced withdrawal side effects commonly associated
with habit-forming drugs. 207 Whether the Paxil plaintiffs can
successfully litigate claims against GSK could turn on how the
court interprets "habit-forming." If a court applying state law
decides that the question of whether Paxil is "habit-forming" is
an essential part of the claim, the question should be deferred
to the FDA for a factual determination. 208 In contrast, if a court
decides that whether Paxil is habit-forming is not essential to
adjudicate the claim, a drug manufacturer could be held accountable to supplement labeling in accordance with factual
determinations made by the jury.209
A.

IF A COURT VIEWS "HABIT-FORMING" AS AN ESSENTIAL
PART OF A PLAINTIFF'S CLAIM

1.

Strict Judicial Review

The legal system must enforce a strict judicial review of
the FDA's factual determinations before sending the determination back into the deferring court. 210 If a court determines
[d.
206 Interview with Donald Farber, San Rafael, Ca (11/26/03).
It should be noted
that since the FDA does not possess any powers beyond those conferred on the federal
government by the Constitution, prohibiting manufacturers from strengthening label
warnings is a violation of the First Amendment. [d. Therefore, manufacturers have all
the power they need to supply more information to the consumer. [d.
207 See supra notes 19-20 and accompanying text.
208 See supra Part III for explanation of primary jurisdiction.
209 [d.
210 KENNETH CULP DAVIS at 272-280, supra note 122; ALFRED C. AMAN, JR. &
WILLIAM T. MAYTON, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw § 13.1 (2d ed. 2001); PRIMARY JURISDICTION
at 1252, supra note 130.
205
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that deciding the question of whether ProcH is habit-forming is
an essential part of a claim, deferral to the FDA is appropriate.2l1 If the issue is deferred to the FDA, the agency would
need to assess Paxil for abuse potentiaU12 Next, the FDA's determination on the question would undergo judicial review. 213
If the FDA's action passes judicial review, the resolved issue
would be returned to the deferring court.214 That court would
then apply the law to the FDA's factual determination.215
According to the FDA, Paxil is not habit-forming. 216 If this
determination passes judicial review, then there is no duty to
warn the plaintiffs and, therefore, no breach.217 The result: the
suit would be dismissed on summary judgment grounds. 218 The
effect: plaintiffs who suffered from severe withdrawal symptoms have no place to go to seek legal redress. 219 This would
suggest that Congress barred relief for persons injured by prescription drugs as a result of a determination made by the very
agency it empowered to provide for the safe and effective use of
prescription drugs. 22o

2.

Adoption of an Accepted Scientific Method

If the FDA has exclusive jurisdiction over the issue of
"habit-forming," it is necessary for the FDA to adopt an accepted scientific method for determining the abuse potential of
a drug. Abuse liability is complex and has many dimensions. 221
See id.
See id.
213 See 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2000) (defining the scope of judicial review and giving
courts the power to set aside an agency action).
21< Id.; see supra note 135 and accompanying text.
215 Id.
216 Brief of the United States at 2, In re Paxil Litigation, No. CV-01-07937 MRP
(CWx) (C.D. Cal filed Sept. 4, 2002); TEMPLE at 4, supra note 187.
217 See id.
216 See id.
219 See supra notes 170-173 and accompanying text.
220 Declaration of Erwin Chemerinsky at 3, In re Paxil Litigation, No. CV-0107937 MRP (CWx) (C.D. Cal. filed Sept. 12, 2002) (citing Medtronic v. Lohr, 518 U.S.
211

212

470, 486-87 (1996». Erwin Chemerinsky is a law professor at the University of Southern California. Id. at 2. He has written four books, over 100 law review articles, and
two treatises all relating to constitutional law and federal court jurisdiction. Id.
221 DRAFT GUIDELINES at 2, supra note 64. (stating that "there is no single test or
assessment procedure that, in itself, is likely to provide a full and complete characterization. Rather the assessment of abuse liability must be based upon review of all
available data ... and summary risks intended to the public health following introduction of the substance to the general population").
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Currently the FDA's approach to determining abuse potential
is outlined in the Draft Guidelines for Abuse Liability Assessment (hereinafter "guidelines").222 Due to the many different
assessment procedures and the continually evolving nature of
science in the area of substance abuse, the FDA's guidelines
decline to adopt a "cookbook" of specific tests. 223 Rather, the
guidelines encourage a "considerable degree of scientific flexibility with respect to precise methods."224
According to the guidelines, not all drugs are assessed to
the same degree for abuse potentia1. 225 The FDA characterizes
the substance in relation to its chemical structure and class. 226
The guidelines point out that "some" assessment should be performed for any new drug that is being developed for an indication that has previously been treated with habit-forming
drugs. 227 Determinations of whether more specific testing is
needed are based on the substance's categorical class. 228 If the
substance is from a new class of drugs, then the guidelines
suggest that it "may" be better to select a comparison class to
act as a reference against which the new substance can be compared. 229
Paxil is an SSRI antidepressant. 23o According to FDA scientists, SSRIs as a class are not habit-forming. 231 As a result,
during Paxil's safety review, the FDA examined only those
clinical studies provided by the drug manufacturer. 232 The FDA
felt that no further independent testing was necessary.233 The
FDA affirmed their conclusion by comparing Paxil with Prozac,
another SSRI. 234
222 [d.
Note that the guidelines are in draft form; this author was not able to find
them submitted in the federal register, or codified in the Code of Federal Regulation.
223

[d.

See id. (The emphasis of the guidelines is on the types of issues to be addressed
rather than specific methodology).
225 [d.
22S [d.
227 See JOHN H. GREIST, M.D. AND JAMES W. JEFFERSON, M.D., DEPRESSION AND
ITS TREATMENT 51 (American Psychiatric Press 1992) (explaining that people suffering
from depression may abuse alcohol or other drugs in attempts to self-medicate).
228 DRAFI' GUIDELINES at 2, supra note 64.
229 [d. at 5.
230 See supra notes 15-18 and accompanying text.
231 See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
23, See BRECHER at 32, supra note 184; KLINE at 4, supra note 62.
233 [d.
"" [d.
22.
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The safety review noted that there have been no reports of
"habit-forming" traits since Prozac's introduction to the market. 235 The FDA, however, has not independently assessed
Poocil's abuse potential. 236 It has, instead, reached its determination solely from information provided by the drug manufacturer. 237
If the FDA is granted exclusive jurisdiction over the factual determination of whether Paxil is habit-forming, the FDA
needs to conduct independent studies on Paxil's abuse potentiaP38 It would be highly likely that a judicial review of the
FDA's factual determinations regarding abuse potential would
disclose when a drug, such as Paxil, has not been independently tested. 239 Judicial review would therefore be an effective
way to ensure that the FDA performs independent studies on a
drug rather than simply relying on information provided by the
drug manufacturer.
B.

A COURT MAy NOT NEED TO KNow IF PAXIL IS "HABITFORMING" IN ORDER TO RESOLVE A CLAIM

A court may decide that it is not necessary to resolve the
technical issue of "whether Paxil is habit-forming" to resolve
the plaintiffs' failure-to-warn claim.240 The court could then
compare Paxil's label warnings with the plaintiffs' alleged experiences to determine if the manufacturer's warnings were

Id.
Id.; see supra notes 221-229 and accompanying text.
237 See supra note 18 for discussion about Paxil's short half-life and the relationship between habit-forming traits and the half life of a drug.
238 Interview with Donald Farber, Law Offices of Donald J. Farber, San Rafael,
Cal. (Nov. 26, 2003).
239 Id.
uo Plaintiff's Reply to Defendant's Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Preliminary
Injunction at 19, In re Paxil Litigation, No. CV-01-07937 MRP (CWx), (C.D. Cal. filed
Aug., 12, 2002), (quoting In re Methyl Tertiary Butyl Ether Products Liability Litigation, 175 F. Supp.2d 593, 617 (S.D.N.Y 2001) ("IT)he issues raised by these claims may
require some technical analysis, questions of whether a product is in fact defective,
whether defendants breached any duties owed to plaintiffs by marketing such a product or failing to give adequate warnings, whether a defendant has conspired to mislead
the public regarding the hazards of a product, and whether a plaintiffs injuries were
caused by a defendants' conduct, are legal questions that fall within the conventional
experience of judges, not administrative agencies.").
235

236
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adequate. 241 In the Paxil litigation, plaintiffs would be able to
litigate claims and possibly obtain relief for damages. 242
1.

Labeling Requirements Should Be Minimal Standards

The FDA should not be granted exclusive jurisdiction over
the term "habit-forming" for several reasons. First, the term
has no accepted medical meaning and should not fall within
the FDA's expertise. 243 "Habit-forming" is a lay term and
should be defined from a societal perspective. 244 As such, in a
failure-to-warn situation, the issues should be resolved by the
jury.245
Second, the effect of allowing the FDA to determine what
"habit-forming" means to the general population is that important risk information would be diluted or kept from drug labeling. Under the learned intermediary doctrine, if the information is not included in the drug label, physicians do not have
access to it.246 If a physician is not aware of a drug's potential
risk, he or she cannot properly balance the information or pass
important information on to patients.
Third, the issue is not whether Paxil is habit-forming.
Rather, the issue is whether physicians and patients are adequately warned of the potential withdrawal side effects associated with discontinuation of Paxil. When a patient experiences
severe side effects from a drug without proper warning (as alleged by the plaintiffs in the Paxil litigation) it is a factual determination within the jurisdiction of the courtS. 247

24' See supra Part I for current labeling requirements and Part IV for withdrawal
symptoms associated with Procil.
242 See supra notes 82-96 and accompanying text.
243 Interview with Donald Farber, San Rafael, Cal. (Nov. 26, 2003) .
... TEMPLE at 4, supra note 187 (declaring that "[the FDA thinks that habitforming] generally implies that patients will seek out the drug and continue to take it
in the absence of a medical need."); But cf Declaration of Kellyanne Conway at 2-5, In
re Paxil Litigation, No. CV-01-07937 MRP (CWx), (C.D. Cal. filed Sept., 12, 2002) (Explaining results of opinion poll which asked the average American to define "habitforming" in their own words). To define "habit-forming" more than 25% used the terms
"addiction" or "becoming addicted." Id. Almost 20% responded that it was "something
you do over and over," "all the time," or "a lot." Id. Close to 15% sad it was "something
you can't stop." Id.
,.. Id.
246 See mpn notes 82-96 and accompanying text.
24' See Chemerinsky at 4, supra note 220.
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Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies

Finally, the administrative process prescribed in the FDCA
requires an aggrieved person to petition the FDA by filing a
citizen petition.24B The FDA must consider the petition and issue a decision to the citizen within 180 days.249 The FDA has
already stated that it does not view Paxil as "habit-forming."25o
As such, the filing of a citizen petition would be a futile effort
increasing delay.251 Therefore, a court should not require the
exhaustion of this administrative remedy before reviewing the
FDA's determination.
VI. CONCLUSION
Even though the FDA has concluded that Paxil is non
habit-forming, it is unlikely that the litigation surrounding
Paxil will disappear. The fact that the FDA has moved the description of withdrawal effects into the Precautions label heading is not enough to ensure that physicians are being adequately educated about potential severe withdrawal effects associated with Paxil and SSRIs. The reality is that when some
patients try to stop using Paxil they experience withdrawal
effects that are so debilitating that they are forced back onto
the drug. They feel violated because they were not warned. 252
In light of the flood of recent litigation, it is important for
courts to understand how preemption and primary jurisdiction
arguments fit into products liability law. Courts need to establish an appropriate working relationship with the FDA regarding claims that arguably fall within the FDA's regulatory
scheme. The FDA needs to adopt an accepted scientific method
to assess the abuse potential of new drugs. Strict judicial review is essential to examine the breadth of the FDA's regulatory power, to ensure that the agency is promoting public
health through the safe and effective use of prescription drugs.
Otherwise, primary jurisdiction becomes a judicially-made doctrine employed by agencies to avoid liability for injuries to
21 C.F.R. § 10.30 (2003).
Id.
250 Plaintiffs Response to Brief of the United States at 9, In re Paxil Litigation,
No. CV-01-07937 MRP (CWx), (C.D. Cal. filed Sept. 23, 2002).
251 Id.
252 See supra notes 1-22 and accompanying text.
248
249
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plaintiffs. This result would grant the FDA a plenary power
that conflicts with the very purpose of our court system.
DENISE K. Top·
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